We describe a policy language and implement its associated proof checking system. In our system, agents can distribute data along with usage policies in a decentralized architecture. Our language supports the specification of conditions and obligations, and also the possibility to refine policies. In our framework, the compliance with usage policies is not actively enforced. However, agents are accountable for their actions, and may be audited by an authority requiring justifications.
Introduction
In many situations, there is a need to share data between potentially untrusted parties while ensuring the data is used according to given policies. This problem is addressed by two main research streams: on one hand, there is a large body of literature on access (and usage) control [8, 16, 11, 4] , on the other hand we find digital rights management [18, 5] . While the former assumes a trusted access control service restricting data access, the latter assume trusted devices in charge of content rendering. Both settings need the trusted components to be available at the moment the request happens, to regulate the data access.
However, there are scenarios (like the protection of private data) in which both access control and digital rights management fail, either because the necessary trusted components are not available or because they are controlled by agents we do not want to trust. For instance, P3P [17] and E-P3P (and also EPAL) [3] are languages that allow one to specify policies for privacy protection; however, the user can only hope that the private data host follows them.
In this paper, the process of regulating the data access is not assumed to be always performed by the same entity at the same moment in which the access is requested. More specifically, we relax this in mainly two ways:
• Firstly, at the moment that the data is requested, we assume that access is always granted, and only later it is determined whether the requestor had permission to access the data. This is the process of auditing. To achieve this, we need all the relevant decision information to be kept until audit time (e.g. keeping secure logs).
• Secondly, the entity that is performing the auditing does not need to be fixed, and can thus be dynamically chosen. This is useful since, for example, some authorities are more appropiate to audit specific agents than others. The actual authority does not even need to be one single entity, and can be for example composed of regular agents.
We present a flexible system which allows to express, deploy and reason about policies controlling the usage of data. In our target setting agents can distribute data along with usage policies within a highly decentralized architecture, in which the enforcement of policies is difficult (if not impossible). Therefore, we use instead an auditing system with best-effort checking by an authority which is able to observe (some) actions. We introduce a notion of agent accountability and express the proof obligation of an agent being audited. The system allows to reason about policies and user accountability. Our framework is depicted in Figure 1 We make no assumptions on the existence of trusted components regulating access (although we do require a trusted environment to certify environmental conditions, and to securely log events). In fact, agents are not forced to follow the policies, but may be audited by authorities which ask for justifications. We make no particular assumptions about authorities; they may comprise, for instance, of groups of regular agents. The more an authority can observe, the more accurate the auditing process is, thus providing more confidence over the agent's behaviour. To characterize compliant agent behaviour, as perceived by an authority, we define accountability tests, which are carried out during auditing by the authority.
Of course, our approach does not allow a strict policy enforcement: agents can easily "misbehave" (i.e. treat data in a way that is not allowed by the policy), at risk of being traced. It is our belief that in many emerging scenarios active policy enforcement is infeasible. This paper builds on the preliminary work reported in [6] . In particular, we provide several extensions, the most notable of which are:
• We include the ability to specify conditions and obligations within the policies.
• Policies may now contain variables and quantifiers. This allows us to define a fundamental rule that gives the ability to refine policies. Agents can create (by refinement) new policies from existing ones, before passing them to other agents. In contrast, in [6] the only policies allowed are those that are explicitly stated by the data owner.
• We precisely describe our system by introducing three functions, namely the observability, conclusion derivation and proof obligation functions. Moreover, we provide a customizable action set to account for particular, user-defined scenarios.
• We define agent accountability tests, and present a (terminating) procedure for recursive auditing.
• Finally, we provide a formalization of our proof system in the proof checker Twelf [13] , which allows us to model proofs provided by agents, and the subsequent checking by the authority (Our formalization covers the lower part of Figure 1 .)
A System of Policies and Actions
Our setup consists of a group of agents executing different actions. The permission to execute an action is expressed by a policy constructed using a special logic, introduced below. In this section we introduce some necessary components for our system.
The basics
Agents are modelled by a set G ranged over by a, b and c (referred to as Alice, Bob, and Charlie). We also have a set of agent variables V a and use A, B, C to range over both agents and agent variables. Similarly we have a set D of data objects, ranged over by d, and a set of data variables V d . We use D to range over data objects and data variables and x, y, z to range over (data and agent) variables.
Basic permissions and facts are expressed by atomic predicates in a set C, ranged over by p. Examples are read(a, d), which expresses that agent a has permission to read data d and partner(a, b) indicating (the fact) that agent a and b are partners. In general, predicates can relate any number of data objects and agents.
The actions that agents execute are modelled using a set of actions ACT , ranged over by act. We assume that two types of actions are always present in this set: Communication (of policies) comm(a ⇒ b, φ) and data creation creates(a, d). (Here a, b are agents and φ is a ground policy formula, as introduced in the next subsection). Our system supports the addition of user-defined actions.
The Policy Language
Policies are used to express permissions that agents have, such as the permission to read a specific piece of data. Some requirements may guard a permission. These requirements can be conditions, as in 'Alice may read the data if she is a partner of Bob', or obligations, as in 'Alice may read the data if she pays Bob 10$'. Besides this, a policy may express or relate several different permissions. To provide maximum flexibility for writing policies, we now introduce the following policy language.
Definition 1
The set of policies Φ, ranged over by φ and ψ, is defined by the following grammar:
First, a policy formula can be a simple predicate p(s 1 , ..., s n ), where s i 's can be either an agent, an agent variable, a data object or a data object variable. Second, we have the A owns D formula, which indicates that A is the owner of data object D.
As we define below, an data owner is allowed to create usage policies related to that data. A says φ to B expresses that agent A is allowed to give policy φ to agent B. The 'says' policy contains a target agent to which the statement is said (different from e.g. [7, 1] ). This allows us to provide a precise way of communicating policies to certain agents. However, the policy A says φ to B carries a different meaning for source agent A than target agent B: While for agent A it represents the permission to send φ to B, for B it represents the possibility to use policy φ and delegate the responsibility to A. The logic constructions and, implication and universal quantification have their usual meaning. We actually have two different instances of the implication. The first, φ ′ → φ, has a policy φ ′ as a condition, stating that the agent first needs to establish this permission or fact before gaining the permission described in φ. The second, ξ → φ, is used to express obligations. The requirement ξ contains an action that the agent has to perform when the permission granted by φ is used. The annotations ! and ? indicate whether the agent needs to do this action every time it uses φ or only once. This will be discussed in Section 3.3. We write φ[D] to indicate that the set D is the data set of φ, i.e. all data objects and data variables occurring in φ. 
Actions and permissions
To distinguish different instances of an action executed in the system, we label each instance using a unique identifier id, as in creates id (a, d). This formally gives a set AC = N → ACT of 'executed actions' or 'action instantiations'. However, when possible, we simply talk about (labeled) actions in AC.
Three properties of actions that play a role in our policy system are described by the following functions:
• The observability function: obs : AC → P (G) describes which agents can observe which actions.
• The proof obligation function: po : (AC × G) → Φ ∪ {⊥} describes which policy an agent needs to justify the execution of an action. Here ⊥ indicates that no policy is needed.
• The conclusion derivation function: concl : (ACT × G) → Φ ∪ {⊥}, describes what policy can an agent deduce after observing an action. Here ⊥ indicates that no policy can be deduced.
While the observability and proof obligation functions depend on executed actions (i.e. with identifiers), the conclusion derivation function is purely syntactical.
For our default actions creates(a, d) and comm(a ⇒ b, φ) we have:
A creation action by a is observed by a (1), while a communication between a and b is observed by both a and b (2). In other settings, there may also be other agents that observe these actions, e.g. a router standing in between a and b. Agents do not need a policy for creating data (3) or receiving a transmission (4). However, sending a transmission does require a permission (5) . If agent Alice creates a piece of data she becomes the owner of this data (6); any other agent can not deduce the ownership (8) . If an agent receives a communication then the agent can conclude the corresponding says statement (7). However, any other agent can not deduce any conclusion (9) .
Remark 1 Our communication comm(a ⇒ b, φ) models a point-to-point communication. We can easily model broadcasting, by introducing an action bcast(a, φ), and setting:
Where ψ = ∀y.a says φ to y.
Here, every agent can observe an action bcast(a, φ) and conclude that a has broadcasted φ i.e. said φ to everybody. Only a needs to justify this action.
The Proof System
In the previous section we introduced the actions that agents can execute and the permissions that agents need to justify these actions, in form of policies. This section describes how agents perform this justification, i.e. how agents can build policies from (simpler) ones. The possibilities for constructing policies are given in the form of a derivation system or proof system for our policy language.
Each rule includes, besides the premises and conclusion, an agent a, called the context of the proof, indicating which agent is doing the reasoning. Our derivation system DER contains the standard predicate logic rules for introduction and elimination of conjunction, implication and universal quantification, together with the following rules:
Rule (SAY) models delegation of responsibility. If agent b says φ to a then a can assume φ to hold. (It is b's responsibility to show that it had permission to give φ to a, see Section 3.3 on accountability.) Although agent a may use φ without further requirement, it does not mean that the agent must always do this. If Bob wants to do a specific sensitive action, he may only want to use communications that he 'trusts' in building his policy. For example, Bob would only trust and thus use a policy 'fire Charlie' if it is provided by his boss. If it is provided to him by coworker Alice, Bob will not use the policy, even though the responsibility of this policy would rest with Alice. In this setting, the problem of establishing and managing trust is orthogonal to the problem of obtaining policies: One could introduce a trust management system to assign a 'level of trust in a proof', and require that different levels of trust are established for different actions (see Section 6).
In our logic, Alice can refine her own policies, e.g. by adding extra conditions and obligations using the standard propositional rules. In addition, rule (REFINE) enables Alice to refine the policies she provides to other agents: if Alice is allowed to send some policy φ then she can also send any refinement of φ.
Rule (OBS ACT) links an action with its conclusion, given by the concl function. (OBS ACT) applies when there is some conclusion (i.e. concl(act, a) =⊥); e.g., from observing action comm(a ⇒ b, φ) b derives a says φ to b.
As we already mentioned, we design the logic in such a way that the owner of some data d decides who is allowed to do which actions on d. In other words, an owner of some data d is allowed to derive usage policies for d, targeted to any other agent. This is achieved by rule (DER POL), which allows the creation of any usage policy for data which the agent owns. Non-owners can refine existing policies (e.g., policies they received), but cannot create new policies from scratch.
A derivation with these rules made by an agent is a proof.
Definition 2 A proof P of φ from agent a is a finite derivation tree such that: (1) each rule of P has a as subject; (2) 
The Model
We now introduce a model for our system, combining the different components of the previous sections. In our system, agents can execute and log actions. In addition to agents, an authority is also present. This authority may audit agents requiring justification for (some of) the agents actions.
Logging actions
Whenever an agent executes an action, it can also choose to log this action. Logged actions constitute evidences that can be used to demonstrate that an agent was allowed to perform a particular action. They are used during accountability auditing, in Section 3.3. When logging an action, an agent can include supporting conditions which the environment certifies to be valid at the moment of execution of the action. This is recorded in the set of predicates conds. We do not model the environment explicitly but instead assume that the agent obtains a secure "package" of signed facts from the environment, represented in conds. As an example, one can think of the driver's license of Alice being checked to certify that she is over 21.
An agent can also include obligations in obligs in a logged action, which refers to other actions the agent did or promises to do. We abstract away from the details of expressing promises, and instead assume we have a way to check if actions have expired. For example, the agent may promise to pay within a day. Then a payment action needs to be done (and logged) within a day of logging this obligation. (Also see Section 3.3.)
Example 3
We continue with Example 1.3. Suppose that we introduce an action drunk(x, y) and a corresponding atomic predicate drink(x, y), with concl(drunk(x, y), x) =⊥ and po(drunk(x, y), x) = drink(x, y). We also introduce an action paid(x, y), with corresponding atomic predicate pay(x, y), with concl(paid(x, y), x) = po(paid(x, y), x) =⊥.
A logged action lac pay for payment is done first by a:
Then, another logged action lac drunk for the action drunk 1 (a, beer) is recorded:
The log of an agent a is a finite sequence of logged actions. Note that it does not need to be a who performed the actions, but of course a has to observe an action to be able to log it. We say that agent a logs action act when act, conds, obligs is appended to the log of a, where conds is some set of conditions and obligs is some set of obligations.
We assume the following consistency properties of logging:
• An agent logs any action at most once, thus within an agent's log the logged actions are uniquely identified by the label (id) of the action.
• An agent can include the same obligation !act id at most once within the obligations of logged actions in its log. (an ?act id action, in contrast, may occur multiple time).
• An agent cannot log an expired action.
Notice that consistency of the log does not have to be checked at time of logging, it is sufficient to check it at time of auditing.
The system model and state
We are ready to introduce our system model.
Definition 4 A system is a 6-tuple:
G, Φ, ACT, obs, concl, po where G is a set of agents, Φ is the policy language, ACT is a set of actions, and obs, concl and po are, respectively, the observability, conclusion and proof obligation functions.
A state S is the collection of logs of the different agents, i.e. a mapping from agents to logs. An agent who observes an action may choose to log this action. Thus by executing action act the system can make a transition from a state S to state S ′ , denoted S act → S ′ where S ′ equals S except that the action act may have have been logged by any agent a that can observe the action, a ∈ obs(act). An execution of the system consists of a sequence of transitions S 0
actn → S n , starting with some initial state S 0 . The execution trace for this execution is act 1 act 2 ... act n . Actions logged by an agent can be also seen as a trace of actions, by projecting only the actions of each logged action. We denote that trace as S(a). Let denote the subtrace relation (tr 1 tr 2 if each action of tr 1 is included in tr 2 , and each time an action act 1 appears before act 2 in tr 1 , the act 1 also appears before act 2 in tr 2 ). We have S(a) tr.
Auditing Authority Agents may be audited by some authority, at some state S. Intuitively, when some agent is about to be audited, an auditing authority is formed. This authority will audit the agent to find whether she is accountable for her actions. Let tr be the sequence of actions executed from some initial state to S, The evidence trace, denoted E, contains all the actions that might be audited. Initially, E embeds S(a). However, E may also contain actions not in S(a): They may be provided, for example, by some observing agents. However, we assume that given S(a) and other observed actions S, the authority can order properly the actions of S(a) and S into E, s.t. E tr. Thus, in general E is a trace satisfying S(a) E tr.
Accountability
We now introduce notions of agent accountability, determined by some authority in possession of evidences. These definitions allow an authority to audit agents, to establish whether the agent was allowed to do the actions he did. In previous work [6] , we defined several notions of agent and data accountability, but without checking for obligations nor conditions. We did not have logs of agents either. We now define accountability for logged actions, which we then extend to agent logs.
We first introduce justification proofs for logged actions. Intuitively, a justification proof is a proof of the policy required for the action (as given by function po), using only conditions and obligations that have been logged.
Definition 5 A proof P of φ from a is a justification (proof) of logged action act, conds, obligs if:
• po(act, a) = φ
• The obligation in the proof are included in obligs; 'oblig(P) ⊂ obligs'. (Here multiple ?act in oblig(P) may be assigned to the same ?act id but each occurrence of !act must have its own !act id in obligs.)
1
• Each condition in the proof is in conds; cond(P) ⊆ conds.
1 interpreting as sets for ?act and as multisets for !act.
The set of all justifications is denoted by J .
In general, there may be different justifications for an action. The justifications provided by the agent are modeled by a function Pr : G × LAC → J ∪ {⊥}. Here Pr(a, act, conds, obligs ) is either a valid justification of act, conds, obligs , or it is ⊥, indicating that the agent did not provide a justification. Definition 6 (Logged Action Accountability) Agent a correctly accounts for logged action logact = act, conds, obligs (in state S), denoted LAA(a, logact), if:
if needed a justification is provided
• if o ∈ obligs has expired then o ∈ S(a), i.e. each obligation that has expired has been (executed and) logged.
• For each act ∈ act (Pr(a, logact) ), a provides an id s.t. act id occurs in tr and a ∈ obs(act id ) 2 This definition introduces accountability for a single (logged) action. We now define accountability for any action and for all audited actions.
Definition 7 (Action Accountability) We say that agent a correctly accounts for (labeled) action act, denoted AA(a, act), if
• a has logged act as logact and LAA(a, logact) or
• a has not logged act and LAA(a, act, ∅, ∅ )
We say agent a passes audit E, written ACC(a, E), if either E is the empty trace, or E = E ′ .act with:
• AA(a, act)
• ACC(a, E ′′ ), with E ′′ the correct ordered merge of E ′ and newacts, all the new actions (i.e. not already in E ′ ) given by the proofs in AA(a, act).
The second case for action accountability explains why it can be in the interest of an agent to log its actions. As conditions may have changed, the agent can only rely on conditions if they have been logged at the time the action was executed. For example, if some action had a condition 'only execute between 4 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. on 12/10/2004', then that condition would only hold temporarily; If an agent executed the action and did not log it, during a later audit the agent could not provide a valid proof. The same holds for obligations: Only obligations logged with the action can be used in a proof of the action.
Claim 1 Let a be an agent and E an evidence trace. Then, checking ACC(a, E) terminates.
Proof. Let |tr| = n, for some n ≥ 0. Suppose |E| = m ≤ n. We show that each execution of ACC(a, E) decreases l, with l = n initially. After every execution of ACC(a, E) as in Definition 7, at most l − m evidences (the newacts) are added to E ′′ . Thus,
Honest Strategy A strategy for an honest agent a to always be accountable is as follows. Before executing some action act, a checks whether po(act, a) is derivable. If any obligation needs to be fulfilled, then the agent performs and then logs it. If any condition or obligation needs to be fulfilled, then the action act is also logged. Then, it follows from the definitions that:
Remark 2 (Accountability of honest agents) If agent a follows the honest strategy, then for any system execution and any auditing authority with evidence set E, we have that ACC(a, E) holds.
The proof follows immediately from Definitions 6 and 7. 2 We assume the authority can verify this.
Recursive auditing
We have, up to now, defined accountability of one particular agent in isolation. However, we may be interested in cross-verifying the actions of agents. We sketch an algorithm for recursive auditing of agents, which can be used by a potential auditing authority. The algorithm inputs S 0 , a set of suspected agents, and E 0 , an initial evidence trace. Given ACC(a, E), we write E(ACC(a, E)) to denote the set of new actions appearing in the given proofs (the newacts in Definition 7), and A(ACC(a, E)) the corresponding set of agents appearing in these actions for which the proof obligation is not bottom, i.e. po(·, ·) =⊥.
Algorithm 1 (Recursive Auditing) Inputs: S 0 and E 0 . Outputs: true if audited agents are accountable, false otherwise. Proof. Similar to the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 3 In line 4 of of Algorithm 1, the order in which the agents are chosen does not matter. Proof (sketch).
Follows from the fact that proofs are fixed on beforehand, as given by function Pr : G × LAC → J ∪ {⊥}, and do not depend on knowing whether other agents are being audited or not. (Intuitively, this models the fact that agents can not change their proofs on the fly, depending on whether other agents are being audited.)
Formalization
We have implemented the proof system and checking of the audit logic in Twelf [13] , which is an implementation of the Edinburgh Logical Framework [12] . Research in proof-carrying code [10] has shown that Logical Framework (LF) provides a suitable notation for proofs to be sent and checked by a recipient. In type theories proof checking reduces to type checking and the LF proof checker is as simple as a programming language type checker (see also Section 5).
Here we only mention the most important features of the implementation. In the appendices we have included both a more abstract representation of it as well as the complete file.
Audit Logic Implementation
We first declare the types of the object logic, the atomic predicates and the actions. Then we present the proof rules and we finish with an example of a complete proof.
Types In Twelf, a metalogic type is of type type. For object logic types, we use the type tp. The meta-logic function -> goes from type to type or kind (type has type kind). Agents, data, actions and policies are declared as tps. Finally, when declaring the rules for the object logic the tm type constructor is used, which casts arguments from tp to type. Policies Recall that policies are formed with says and owns and for example scenario-specific atomic predicates like print:
says: tm agent -> tm policy -> tm agent -> tm policy. owns: tm agent -> tm data -> tm policy. print: tm agent -> tm data -> tm policy.
For instance, (print a d) is a policy stating that agent a has permission to print document d. Policies can also be formed using the usual propositional connectives and universal quantification 3 (except for negation and disjunction); to model the different instances of implication in the policy language (see definition 1), we declare separate instances for use-onceobligations and use-many-obligations:
imp: tm policy -> tm policy -> tm policy. forall: (tm T -> tm policy) -> tm policy. and: tm policy -> tm policy -> tm policy. ?imp: tm action -> tm policy -> tm policy. !imp: tm action -> tm policy -> tm policy.
Below we assume that the connectives imp forall and ?imp !imp are declared as infix-operators.
Actions
The actions creates and comm have the following types:
creates: tm agent -> tm data -> tm action. comm: tm agent -> tm agent -> tm policy -> tm action.
The conclusion derivation function describes the policies the agent can deduce from some action. The OBS ACT rule works as follows. If an agent A can conclude the policy Φ by observing action act, then she can deduce Φ from any set Γ containing act. In formula Γ, act; ∆ ⊢ A Φ, in Twelf:
obs_act: concl Act A Phi -> entail A (cons (act_c Act) Gamma) Delta Phi.
The formalization of the DER POL rule is not straightforward in Twelf. Recall that any formula can be derived as a conclusion, as long as, for all data in it, the ownership is proven. It is enough to be able to derive the atomic predicates, since for more complex formulas we can use the corresponding right-rules. We define the two relations dts and entl to handle the cases of the atomic predicates. dts relates a list of data to a policy iff all data in the policy is in the list. D and DS are data and list of data respectively and in is the predicate that indicates wether an element occurs in the list: 3 Quantification over policies is not allowed, so we only instantiate the ∀-left and -right rules for the types agent and data. The entailment relation entl A Gamma Delta PS holds iff A can deduce all policies in PS:
entl: tm agent -> list nonlin -> list lin -> list policy -> type. entl_nil: entl A Gamma Delta nil. entl_cons: entail A Gamma Delta P -> entl A Gamma Delta PS -> entl A Gamma Delta (cons P PS).
Here cons is one of the list constructors. Now the DER POL rule is defined as follows:
where map is the function that applies a function to all elements in a list. Please note that the structural rules and the logical rules for conjunction, implication and universal quantification over agents and data are omitted here, but they can be found in the appendices. This theorem has been checked by Twelf. The proof goes along the same lines as previously in Table 1 .
Example 4 (Formalization of Example 2)
The lhs can be expressed as γ; δ ⊢ a (a says φ to b), where φ is ∀x. rel(d, x) → print(b, d) and γ only contains the creates action, while δ is empty. In the proof above, imp_r is the imp−right rule, forall_r_data is the ∀−right rule for quantification over data, w_l and init are weakening-left and the initial sequent axiom for the non-linear sequent. The rules map_nil and map_cons are the rules that define the map function.
Related Work
There is a wide body of literature on logics in Access Control (see the survey by Abadi [1] ). Here, we mention some of the proposals. Binder [7] is a logic-based security language based on Datalog Binder includes a special predicate, says, used to quote other agents. Binder's says differs in two aspects from our construct: First, ours includes a target agent (see Section 2.4); Second, when importing (i.e. communicating a policy in our setting) a clause in Binder, care must be taken to avoid nested says, since it may introduce difficulties in their setting. More related to our auditing by means of proofs, Appel and Felten [2] propose the Proof-Carrying Authentication framework (PCA), also implemented in Twelf (see Section 4).
Differently from our work, PCA's language is based on a higher order logic that allows quantification over predicates. Also, their system is implemented as an access control system for web servers, while in our case we focus on a-posteriori auditing.
BLF [19] is an implementation of a Proof-Carrying-Code framework that uses both Binder and Twelf, which however focuses on checking semantic code properties of programs.
Sandhu and Samarati [16] give an account of access control models and their applications. Bertino et al. [4] propose a framework for reasoning on access control models, in which authorization rules treat the core components Subjects, Objects and Privileges. Sandhu and Park [11] take a different approach with their UCON-model, in which the decision is modelled as a reference monitor that checks the 3 components: ACL, Conditions and Obligations. This reflects much the separation also made by us. Obligations and conditions are also prominent in directives on privacy and terms of use in DRM. The concept of purpose of an action is not used by us, but is used in the privacy languages P3P and E-P3P [3] . Unlike our policy language, E-P3P allows the use of negation, which requires special care to avoid problems in a distributed setting.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a flexible usage policy framework which enables expressing and reasoning about policies and user accountability. Enforcement of policies is difficult (if not impossible) in the highly distributed setting we are considering. Instead, we propose an auditing system with best-effort checking by an authority depending on the power of the authority to observe actions. A notion of agent accountability is introduced to express the proof obligation of an agent being audited.
Our obligations cover pre-and post-obligations ( [15] ) but not yet ongoing obligations. The setup does, with an adaption of the definitions of accountability, seem to provide the means to include this type of obligations. Obligations are 'use once', e.g. !pay($10) or 'use as often as wanted' ?pay($10).
Our proof system has been implemented using the proof checker Twelf. The agents develop proofs using this implementation. Likewise, the implementation allows an authority to check the agents' proofs.
In our system, we include a powerful rule which allows delegating any policy to any other agent. Agent Alice may only want to use a policy from Bob if she (i) knows Bob, (ii) authenticates Bob, and (iii) trusts Bob. All these issues are (intentionally) abstracted away in our approach, as they seem to be orthogonal to our aims. For example, in (iii), the required level of trust may depend on the policy provided by Bob or on the way Alice is going to use the policy. There, a distributed trust management system (e.g. [9] ) could be employed to obtain the required level of trust.
In the work of Samarati et.al. [14] , a discussion about decentralized administration is presented. Specially, the revocation of authorizations is addressed. This is acomplex problem, which occurs as a consequence of the delegation of privileges. One could model revocation of policies by adding a special flag plus a corresponding check in a policy. However, checking whether a flag is set in another agent's environment is not realistic in our highly distributed setting. Further research is needed to find a both practical and realistic way to include rights revocation.
Our implementation only covers proof checking. Revisiting Figure 1 , we find that arrows covering policy communications and logging are not yet implemented. Our framework requires several properties for each of the different modules (e.g. secure logging and non-repudiable communications). Certainly, these properties need cryptography to be realized securely. We regard as future work the rigorous cryptographic definition of these properties, along with the accompanying cryptographic constructions.
Finally we have the structural rules for both contexts. Except that the linear context doesn't allow for contraction.
tm: tp -> type.
entail A (cons (pol_c Phi) Sigma) Epsilon Chi ->
